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The authors discuss the features of protests in Kazakhstan and identify their factors and caus-
es. The analysis of the content of the sociological surveys, the posts on the social networks, 
the web sides and blogs of Kazakhstan’s top officials enabled the authors to establish the issues 
of social and economic nature that are the most probable triggers of protests. The authors 
conceptualize their root causes as a discrepancy between the articulated goals of moderniza-
tion and poor performance of the public administration responsible for their implementation. 
The authors’ analysis goes beyond the changes of protest behavior and includes the responses 
of the state organs and the role of the Internet. Further, the article provides a typology of the 
protests occurred in Kazakhstan and deals with their scale and scope. The article also touches 
upon the means employed by the state to diffuse social tensions and the respective role of civil 
society institutions, which is argued to be insufficient. The authors conclude that the protests 
in Kazakhstan are spatially and topically limited, as is their destructive potential. Kazakhstan 
shall not anticipate massive protest actions due to the impact of the currently implemented 
social and economic reforms, commitment of the majority of its citizens to maintenance of 
political stability and their fear of possible destructive consequences, as well as the lack of any 
organized political force capable of transforming public discontent into political actions and 
underdevelopment of civil society. 
Keywords: protests, conflicts, modernization, state, government. 
Introduction
Protests are integral for any political system. Protests are more likely to occur while 
a political system is undergoing the process of its development or transformation. Popu-
lar uprisings during the Arab Spring throughout the Middle East and North Africa that 
resulted in overthrowing of the political regimes in those countries appear to be the vivid 
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examples thereof [1, p. 340; 2 p. 301; 3, 54]. Protests of that sort may have quite drastic 
consequences. In Syria, they evolved into a bloody armed conflict. 
However, more established systems may be also prone to protests. The Western Eu-
ropean governments are challenged by manifest frustration of the masses about the social 
and economic situations in those countries [4]. The current wave of the “gilets jaunes” 
(yellow vests) movement is spearing beyond the French borders, gaining momentum and 
acquiring a rather distinctive political character [5]. 
Thus, the probability of protests and their potential to cause drastic destabilization 
is the questions that shall not be overlooked. Kazakhstan is not immune from such de-
velopments; some mass protests accrued there as well. Understandably, these protests are 
generally seen as challenging the social stability. Given their acute importance, there have 
been increasing number of studies and surveys to measure the level of social tensions and 
conflict potential, conducted on the regular basis by several research institutes and think 
tanks in Kazakhstan [6, p. 90; 7, p. 56; 8, p. 51; 9, p.102; 10, p.175].
However, these days, we are not only witnessing the protests that are growing in 
terms of their frequency, intensity or composition of their participants, we are dealing 
with changing “discourses” and “repertoire” thereof. This actualizes and problematizes 
the question of how we study such protests. The enquiry that provided the basis for this 
article was conceived with this question in mind. Thus, the authors were well aware that, 
in addition to such a conventional method as survey, some newer, more adequate tech-
niques of data collection to study protest behavior were to be employed. Those techniques 
included search query of the electronic and printed media; monitoring of the social media 
and social networks; and examining the content of the posts, i.e. complaints and queries, 
submitted electronically on the official websites of particular government agencies and 
officials. Those methods enabled the authors to have a clearer picture of the factors, root 
causes as well as of the protest behavior patterns in Kazakhstan. 
Thus, the protests that have been occurring in Kazakhstan for the last decade are in 
the focus of the scholarly attention of the authors, who examined and analyzed the data 
collected by them independently and by other researchers in order to find the answer to 
the following questions: what issues are more likely to trigger protests in Kazakhstan; how 
can the protests, that already have occurred, be categorized in terms of their participants, 
subject matter, forms and means as well as the response of the authorities; how does the 
Internet influence the dynamics of the protests; what is the role of civil society; is there 
any probability of mass violet protests in Kazakhstan that could threaten political stability 
in this country?
As it has been mentioned above, the analysis is sourced by the primary and second-
ary data. The secondary data have been collected through a series of sociological surveys 
and studies conducted by the Institute of World Economy and Politics under the Founda-
tion of the First President of Kazakhstan, the Institute of Eurasian Integration, the “Open 
Society” International Institute for Regional Research, the Kazakhstan Institute for Socio-
Economic Information and Forecasting, the “Social Perspective” Public Foundation, the 
Research Institute for International and Regional Cooperation at the Kazakh-German 
University, the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakh-
stan, and the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law.
As it will be shown further, the surveys informed merely on the issues that the respond-
ents identified as the most possible triggers of future protests and on their own personal in-
474 Вестник СПбГУ. Философия и конфликтология. 2019. Т. 35. Вып. 3
clinations to engage into such protest activities. The declaratory nature of such data prompt-
ed further attempts by the authors to find out more about how those declarations correlated 
with the actual protest behavior of the citizens of Kazakhstan. This is how the primary data 
was collected and analyzed via search query of the Kazakhstan press and the monitoring of 
the social media and social networks. Additionally, there was the five-year qualitative con-
tent analysis on the complaints and quires posted on the blogs of the governments agencies 
and officials and their respective Facebook accounts. Moreover, the study incorporated the 
transcripts of 35 in-depth interviews with the experts sampled according to their profes-
sional status and affiliation; civil servants, representatives of NGOs, think tanks, members of 
political parties, and security agencies officers. 
Potential Triggers of Protests in Kazakhstan
Prior a more details analysis of potential triggers of the protest activity in Kazakhstan, 
the popular social feelings were examined in order to identify what people think about the 
likelihood of mass protests. According the sociological survey conducted in 2015, a third 
of respondents believed that there were good reasons for protesting and 27.6 % of them 
said that the protests are “likely” to happen, while 6.8 % were firmly convinced that protests 
might begin at any time soon. Importantly, the respondents with lower incomes were more 
likely to believe that there were all reasons for people to start protesting. The share of those 
who thought protests were “highly unlikely” or even “impossible” was 43.1 % [9, p. 55].
Having studied people’s expectations, the authors focused on those issues that might 
motivate people to participate into a protest. The social survey on the Standards of Living 
in Kazakhstan and Inequality gives the authors the grounds to argue that the social and 
economic issues: namely, unemployment, inflation, corruption, violation of the workers’ 
rights, high housing and public utilities bills, and overall deterioration of the relations 
between the people and the state may become the most likely triggers for the protests in 
Kazakhstan (see Table 1). 
The other argument is that the rise of the protest activity is never sudden, there are 
always some signs and indicators. The most important of such indicators are the lack of 
trust to the government and politicians, pessimistic attitudes to the future, uncertainty 
and lack of social security, various rumors, migration, complaints and resentment and so 
on. The authors had been examining the content of the complaints posted on the blogs of 
the government ministers and other officials as well as the social media posts for five years 
and found out that 80 % of the complaints and posts examined were about unemployment, 
rising prices, and the lack of decent housing. People were also concerned about poor qual-
ity of medical services and corruption in the law enforcement. The analysis showed that 
economic inequality had caused resentment among general public and increased tensions 
between them and the state.
The authors’ findings were reaffirmed by the experts interviewed during the study. 
“The root causes of conflicts are ignored or overlooked. Discontent and resentment is 
growing gradually approaching the critical level. Recent protests show that people are well 
aware of injustice. We live in a new social reality and the major feature thereof is profound 
dissatisfaction with the policies pursued by the political classes. Overwhelming majority 
of people are dissatisfied with their lives and craving for change” — said an interviewed 
expert.
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Table 1. Issues with Biggest Protest Potential and Possible Personal Involvement ( % of respondents)
Factor that may trigger 
protests
Factors prompting personal 
involvement in protests 
Rising prices, rising utilities bills, 
inflation, devaluation of the national 
currency 
50,1 16,9
Unemployment; law salaries and wages, 
students’ burses, pensions, and benefits 50,5 18,8
Social inequality, income inequality, 30  11
Lack of due process 28,9 11,3
Lack of social justice 27,9  10,8
Violation of human rights, corruption, 
abuse of power 31  12,8
Problematic inter-ethnic relations 17,9  6,9
Problematic religious issues 19,9  6,3
Actions and pronouncements of the 
opposition 14,3 4,9
Problems of urbanization, migrants 
(including those from rural areas) 13,8  5,9
Environmental issues 17,6  8,9
Inability to pay off the bank loans 17,4  7,5
No reasons to protest/to be involved 
personally 22,2 41,4
Other 5,3  7
Source: Standards of Living in Kazakhstan and Inequality, Social Survey, 2015 [9].
Therefore, it is very important to remember that failure to identify and understand 
the issues that are the most important for the majority of the peoples would rather mean 
that the root causes of protests remain overlooked and the factors of possible escalation 
of conflicts are not addressed properly. In the long run, such profound but rather latent 
discontent may have destructive social effect leading, potentially, to the spontaneous out-
burst of the masses. 
Having processed the above data, the authors would rather suggest, in the most gen-
eral terms, that the main cause of the protests in Kazakhstan is an apparent discrepancy 
between the declared goals of modernization and the methods how those goals are being 
fulfilled. It shall be noted that since its independence, Kazakhstan set a course of the re-
forms that should have been socially beneficial to the majority of its citizens. For example, 
the Addresses to the People of Kazakhstan of President Nazarbayev, if closely examined, 
offer a comprehensive but rather detailed program of social modernization [11, p. 92]. 
However, the authors concur with those experts who point at particular risks associated 
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with poor implementation of such program by the public administration and formalist 
attitudes of the civil servants “on the gourd” together with corruption and embezzlement, 
all these compromise the entire development strategy in the eyes of the general public 
making it barely implementable [12, p. 50].
President Nazarbayev repeatedly stressed the necessity for the strategies and pro-
grams to be designed and adopted in a such way so that they would bring on improve-
ments in healthcare, infrastructure and education. All necessary funds had been assigned, 
yet systematic work was never started. Real incomes have not been increasing. The share 
of food expenses of an average household in Kazakhstan is growing. Some vulnerable 
people have not been reached by the civil services responsible for providing targeted so-
cial care. The situation is even more aggravated as great number of government ministers 
and local akims (governors) fail to communicate with their constituencies, being unable 
or unwilling to listen to people and to convey the major points of the state policies [13]. 
The Protests Occurred in Kazakhstan
Having studied the issues that might motivate people to demonstrate their dissatis-
faction, the authors focused on the protests that had occurred Kazakhstan during the last 
decade with the participants of various ages and walks of life: pensioners, students, work-
ers, public sector employees and others. 
The analysis of the press and electronic media materials as well as the social media 
content showed that those protests were sporadic in nature and limited in terms of their 
scope and subject matter. In other words, certain, not sizable groups of people protest-
ed about rather particular issues of their concerns, which, however, were not shared by 
broader public. For example, the heavy industry workers (more often employed at the 
enterprises partly or entirely owned by foreign owned) demanded the increases of the 
wages or elimination of the wage discrimination: the situation when the foreign employ-
ees are payed disproportionally higher than their local counterparts. Owners of the land 
plots protested against the demolition of houses and demanded the compensation of their 
losses. Pensioners protested against increasing utilities tariffs and bills. Women protested 
against raising the retirement age of female employees from 58 to 63. Their protests led 
to the resignation of the Minister of Labor and Social Security. Number of prominent 
public figures and activists expressed their concerns about the status of the official state 
language and about drastically deteriorating environmental situation in Kazakhstan. Stu-
dents protested against raising of the tuition fees. Journalists agitated for better freedom of 
expression especially in the printed media and the Internet. Right-hand drive cars owners 
demanded the abolition of the restrictive measures imposed on them by the government. 
Hoodwinked investors demanded reparations and renationalization of all problematic 
construction industry enterprises. Interestingly enough, their protesters proved to be the 
most organized. For example, they formed the “Leave Houses to People” movement. 
The Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law suggests 
that all the protest in Kazakhstan fall into one of the following three categories. The first 
includes the demonstrations and rallies of the people who are concerned about particular 
political issues. These, above all, are the actions aimed at demonstrating popular disagree-
ment with the actions of the authorities (or the lack thereof), to manifest political disaffec-
tion, to convey the message of discontent and outrage to the government. The second in-
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cludes the protests related to all spectrum of social issues. The third category includes the 
actions triggered by difficulties faced by people due to the economic policies implemented 
in Kazakhstan such as labor disputes, mortgage and housing problems, utilities payments 
e.t.c. Importantly, the analysis of the character of all peaceful protests in Kazakhstan since 
2010 shows the consistent trend of their depoliticization [15, p. 10], while social issues, 
have been gaining momentum (see Table 2).
Table 2. Intensity and Subject Matter of the Protests in Kazakhstan
Year Political Economic Social 
2010  40 % 53 % 7 %
2011–2012  9 % 58 % 33 %
2012–2013  (1 action) 70 % 29 %
2014  — 49 % 51 %
2015  — 45 % 55 %
2016  15,5 % 15,5 % 69 %
2017  5,5 % 16,6 % 78 %
Source: The Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, 2018 [15].
The fact that peaceful assemblies with political agendas are less common is attributed 
by the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law to cleansing 
of the political space from any oppositional parties or public associations barely disloyal to 
the authorities. Secondly, under the law in Kazakhstan, there are very strict rules of hold-
ing peaceful assemblies. It creates serious thresholds for those who wishing to hold a pro-
test actions and stipulates for severe sanctions for those who choose to disobey1 [14, p. 9].
The state control machinery and law enforcement is frequently used against those 
who are trying to organize peaceful assemblies with a political agenda. The Activists of the 
oppositional political forces are constantly under heavy pressure; permissions are denied 
on the regular basis, the leaders are detained — report the experts of the Kazakhstan In-
ternational Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, [14, p. 10]. 
The next important trend is a changing character of the protest behavior per se. This 
is largely due to the fact that modern protests technologies heavily depend on the use of 
the Internet. The Internet, according to researchers, is not only a mechanism for commu-
nication but a space where protest attitudes, beliefs and values are being developed and 
respective behavior patterns are being formed. Thus, regulation of the Internet, in some 
form or another, has been a constant item of the government agenda [15, p. 224].
Having examining the activities in the internet, the authors argue that one of its dis-
tinguishing features is that they may not even go beyond the cyber space. There have been 
numerous on-line petitions demanding demission of certain ministers or reformation in 
1 The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Organization and Conducting of Peaceful Assemblies, 
Rallies, Processions, Pickets and Demonstrations in the Republic of Kazakhstan, available at: http://adilet.
zan.kz/rus/docs/U950002126_ (accessed: 05.03.2019).
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certain spheres of public administration. It shall be noted that, in some cases, such forms 
of pressure prove to be rather effective. For example, the murder of Denis Ten, the famous 
figure skater, aroused indignation all over social networks; people demanded profound 
purge and reforms of the Internal Affairs Ministry. The other means to maintain pressure 
on the top officials personally or express profound disapproval of certain policies are the 
memes, GIFs, cartoons, and photographs ridiculing the respective personalities or actions 
with clear protest messages. These activities became increasingly popular and the authors 
categorize them as the form of protest behavior. 
As for the efficiency of the Internet, some experts stress that on-line activities and ac-
tivism may indeed impact political decision making. When the entire Cabinet in Kazakh-
stan was dismissed, the newly formed one lacked those ministers who were most strongly 
criticized in the social networks. When examining the findings of the survey conducted 
five years ago, the authors notice that 33.7 % respondents who were regular internet users 
demonstrated their readiness to participate in mass protests more than others [10, p. 140]. 
With this in mind, one may reach the conclusion that on-line activism may pose threat. 
Under the condition where the government is either unwilling or unable to meet the social 
needs of population, on-line activism may be easily transformed into real off-line actions 
of such a scale that no one would be able to control. 
There have been the protests in Kazakhstan that caused celebre throughout the coun-
try and prompted the authorities to intervene, namely the events in the city of Zhanaozen 
in 20112 and the wave of the protests against the land reform in 20163 [16, p. 134]. In 
February 2019, mothers of many children protested vigorously all over Kazakhstan. The 
protests were triggered by the tragic death of five children in a fire in the city of Astana 
while both parents were absent from home trying to provide for their family. The moth-
ers demanded to take urgent measures to solve housing problems, to provide law-income 
families with allowance so that they could purchase of thecoal in winter and pay their util-
ity bills and to prolong the period when mothers are entitled for childcare benefits from 
one to three years [17].
It shall be noted that as the patterns of the protest behavior changed so did the re-
sponses of the authorities. Thus, during the latest protests of the mothers, the authorities 
demonstrated their readiness to find the solutions; the Ministry of Labor and Social Se-
curity publicly announced their commitment to tackle the issues raised during the rallies, 
the working group on larger families was established in Astana, local authorities provided 
some assistance. Various solutions were offered to the mothers by the regional akims (gov-
ernors). 
Although there have been instances when the internet protest activities and activism 
made the authorities to respond more or less promptly, a number of interviewed experts 
warned against premature conclusion that the Internet directly caused the recent resigna-
tion of the Cabinet in Kazakhstan. “It would be suffice to dismiss a couple of the most 
unpopular ministers to show that the authorities were responsive to the concerns of the 
2 The strike of oil industry workers in the Mangystau Region of Southwest Kazakhstan resulted in 
major unrest in the city of Zhanaozen.
3 In the spring of 2016, the amendments to land legislation caused negative reaction throughout in 
Kazakhstan. As a result, the public debate turned into the protests in a number of regions of Kazakhstan. 
To resolve the situation, the Land Reform Commission was established by the President Nazarbayev, which, 
eventually, provided the platform for a constructive dialogue between the state and the people. 
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public. However, the fact the entire cabinet had to resign helped to diffuse the situation 
although the resignation per se was not caused by it” — one of the interviewed experts 
argued. 
In the context of this study, it is also worth pointing out that the political classes, the 
Head of the State in particular, are apparently well aware of the importance of social issues. 
Speaking on February 27 before the delegates of the XVIII Congress of the “Nur Otan” 
party, Nursultan Nazarbayev once again emphasized that ensuring the decent standards 
of living and the overall progressive development of Kazakhstan should remain the prior-
ity. “The Government should pay special attention and take special care of the low income 
larger families” — said President Nazarbayev. Currently, more than 111 thousand families 
(571.6 thousand people) are the recipients of the targeted aid provided by the state [18]. 
The analysis of the protests in Kazakhstan shows that they may be rather efficient. 
Today, conventional wisdom suggests that some causation exists in this respect: “iden-
tification of a problem” followed by “protests” that lead to “awareness raising and pub-
lic attention” and bring on the subsequent “change of the behavior of the authorities”. 
Therefore, the authors alongside with some experts, stress the need for their better in-
stitutionalization: political protest behavior shall be better organized, self-regulated and 
institutionalized so that the norms and rules could be formulated and observed by the all 
parties concerned. Neither the state nor the public shall see protests as a provocation of 
the marginal, rather they shall be regarded as proper means to resolve the social conflicts. 
Thus, is important to be able to identify the moment when patience of people runs thin 
and the desperate masses are on the age of protests [19, p. 7].
Role of Civil Society
The authors premise their analysis on the argument that a policy aiming at mainte-
nance of social harmony is only effective if based on close engagement of the state and 
the civil society. Without underestimating the stabilizing role of the state, its institutions 
and organs in conflict resolution, it should be noted that when such a stability is achieved 
through a rigid vertical power its positive effect may not last. The well established chan-
nels of communication that provide for timely and clear feedback are necessary to prevent 
destructive conflicts, otherwise the system is just unsustainable in the long run. 
So, when intervening in a conflict situation, the state often opts for using the police 
or security services. Although no one would argue against their involvement in a situa-
tion of acute clashes to prevent promptly any violent and other unlawful actions, one shall 
remember that such engagement deals only with the consequences while the root causes 
remain untackled and the latent conflict not revealed. Therefore, the autors would argue 
that the use of force, shall be considered as the last resort in avery particular circumstances 
due to the following reasons. Firstly, it may not resolve a conflict but push it underground. 
Secondly, it may provoke resistance instead of reaching an agreement. Thus, the use of 
force increases the likelihood of the conflict to reemerge. Finally, it may signal that the 
government lacks any constructive operational technologies of conflict management. In 
other words, the use of force most often makes it more difficult to achieve consensus, pro-
motes destructiveness and makes conflicts more potent.
Among the institution of civil society, political parties are traditionally seen crucial 
in conflict resolution as they allow the different social strata and groups to reconcile their 
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interests, At the same time, it should be noted that distrust of political parties has been 
an integral element of the political culture of Kazakhstan. People in Kazakhstan simply 
do not regard political parties as an efficient intermediary between the government and 
the citizens. The authors attribute such a distrust to rather apparent “imposter” character 
of those parties created “from above” and to the fact that the parties’ infrastructure and 
membership are used to ensure electoral mobilization and voting turnout. The parties of 
the opposition are seen as ineffective. 
Thus, in the authors opinion, political parties do not play any significant role in dif-
fusing the tensions in Kazakhstan. Their own clashes rarely reflect the conflicts of interests 
of social groups notwithstanding the interests of those involved into the protest actions. 
They are often seen as nothing more than the clashes of personal ambitions. In other 
words, interparty interaction is an additional means of confrontation between various 
political forces failing to provide any institutionalized space for conflict resolution and 
maintenance of the balance of interests of various social groups. 
NGOs, as another element of an institutionalized civil society, is traditionally seen as 
the important actor capable of sending to the authorities the signals that some preventive 
measures are urgently required in a particular domestic situation. In quantitative terms, 
the available data depicts quite confusing picture about the NGOs in Kazakhstan. Accurs-
ing to some estimates, there has been steady increase in the number of the non-govern-
mental organizations: in 2006 there were more than 25,000 registered NGOs, whereas in 
2011 their number exceeded 36,000. However, the revision conducted in 2016 revealed 
the reduction in the number of NGOs; as it turned out, some registered organizations had 
been inactive [20, pp. 54–55]. There are currently 2,931 organizations in the official NGO 
database by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Civil Society of Kazakhstan [21]. 
In the course of our in-depth interviews, the experts suggested that the activity and 
agendas of Kazakhstan’s NGOs focus more on the issues of private concerns of a limited 
number of people rather than on the common good. Too many of those organizations are 
the grantees of either international sponsors or the Government, too often their activities 
are sporadic, they operate when they have money and froze all activates when the granted 
funds are exhausted. Some NGOs are essentially fictitious. Some conduct the work that is 
of little resemblance of the statutory goals. 
In this context, it is important to note that a number of studies revealed rather criti-
cal attitudes towards the non-governmental sector among general public in Kazakhstan. 
Together with political parties, they do not enjoy much trust: political parties (19.9 %), 
public associations (18.8 %), and the trade unions (17.8 %). Therefore, the overall reach of 
the NGOs sector in Kazakhstan remains insignificant [22, p. 137].
With that in mind, the authors argue that in order to improve the potential of the 
society to prevent mass destructive outbursts, the NGOs shall be engaged more into con-
flict situations, their preventive capacities shall be enhanced. For instance, the NGOs may 
participate in the development of the policies aimed at defusing of potential conflicts; 
protecting human rights; prompting the third sector activities beyond the major cities, 
reaching all the regions especially the remote rural areas; ensuring that their activities and 
initiatives are covered in the media on a regular basis. 
The final premise of the analysis is that stability in a democratic nation is supposed 
to be based on social partnership. However, social partnership in Kazakhstan does not 
appear to be functioning effectively either. For example, the trade unions in Kazakhstan 
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are not fully prepared to use all available methods to protect the interests and rights of the 
workers. They rarely initiate negotiations over collective agreements and barely monitor 
the observance of the agreed terms. Weakness and passivity of the trade unions inevitably 
leads to increased tensions between the capital and the labor. It is especially important as 
the employee-employer relations within Kazakhstan’s industries are deteriorating, gradu-
ally becoming one of the most conflict-saturated spheres. Increasing number and scale of 
the strikes occurred throughout the country is the clear evidence of that [23].
Probability of Mass Protests in Kazakhstan 
Having surveyed the triggers, scope, means, and participants of the protests in Ka-
zakhstan, as well as the influence of the Internet, the role of the state and the civil society, 
the authors raise the question whether there is actual risk of emergent mass protests in 
Kazakhstan. The authors define mass protest as those meeting three following criteria: 
the first, they shall occur simultaneously in several locations, preferably those beyond 
the major cities; the second, the issue people are protesting about shall be of the broadest 
appeal possible, it shall concern the interests and the rights of the majority of people; the 
third, they shall involve people of all walks of life, those representing all (or almost all) 
classes and strata of the population. Thus, for the purposes of this study, mass protest are 
defined as a widespread public actions organized into a united movement to demonstrate 
resentment, objection, or disapproval of certain acute or intended actions of the authorities. 
Given the above definition, it can be argued that the events discussed above in this article 
do not meet the threshold. 
Further, the authors argue that genuinely mass protests are rather unlikely in Kazakh-
stan in the near future as the citizens are not typically inclined to any sort of destructive 
behavior; their discontent is usually locally and topically limited. Our argument is prem-
ised on the following:
 — Kazakhstan is still undergoing the process of societal structuration and 
stratification, the collective interests of various strata have not been fully grasped 
or articulated, the capacity of social groups for effective self-organization is still 
poor; 
 — there is no any organized political force, such as political parties, civic movements, 
or independent trade unions, that would be able and willing to transform protest 
sentiments into consolidated organized protest actions;
 — the strategy of a consistent and rather large proportion of population is that of 
survival and adaptation. 
In this sense, our suggestions are reaffirmed by the findings of the survey conducted 
to identify the level of resilience of the population in Kazakhstan that are quite 
illustrative: “it is not that bad after all” — 42 % of respondents agreed with such 
statement; “life is hard, but still tolerable” — is the position of 28.2 %; “I may put up 
with such a life, but not for long” — said 23.5 % of those being surveyed; and only 
6.1 % stated that they were not ready “to endure such a plight no longer” [24, p. 16]. 
 — fear of change; even those who are strongly discontented about the current situation 
are not inclined to take any radical actions preferring graduate reforms to drastic 
changes, they would not alter their lifestyles or disturb their plans and aspirations 
however modest those might be. 
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A number of studies surveyed in the context of this research reveal what people in 
Kazakhstan fear most and these are revolutions, mass rallies and demonstrations. The pos-
sible consequences of political protests are seen as negative rather than positive and are 
feared by majority of people [25, p. 176]. Therefore, the state is easily capable to neutralize 
those who participate in the protest actions. This capacity is only reinforced of overall 
uncertainty when their anxiety turns into fear of destabilization.
In the authors opinion, in the short term, these adaptation mechanisms may pro-
tect against social upheavals. But in the long term, such latent resentment, without any 
institutionalized forms to be demonstrated, may bring on outbursts of mass protest even 
riots with quite destructive consequences. Therefore, the authors would warn against the 
tendency to overestimate such resilience, since these forms of adaptation — being forced 
upon people — are rather unsustainable. Those whose interests have been systematically 
infringed sooner or later come to the idea that they would have to protect them by force. 
This is especially true of those who live below the poverty line, those who are deprived of 
any institutionalized and legitimate mechanisms to express their discontent. These people 
may become more susceptible to extremist forms of social and political behavior. 
 — absence of so-called “external actors” interested in meddling into Kazakhstan’s 
affairs. Destabilization of Kazakhstan may result in destabilization of the entire 
region. Thus, the current situation makes both Russia and China economically 
dependent on maintenance of stability in Central Asia. 
Conclusions
The authors reached the following conclusions. Firstly, there are consistently present 
factors in Kazakhstan that balance each other; those contributing into growth of the con-
flict potential and those defusing such potential. Secondly, the protests in Kazakhstan are 
most likely to be triggered by social and economic issues. Thirdly, protests in Kazakhstan 
shall not be seen as a mere indicator of instability, rather they are revealing the conditions 
when society is ready to adopt new legal and institutionalized means to express publicly the 
existing conflict of interests. Fourthly, as overwhelming majority of Kazakhstan’s citizens 
are not inclined towards unconventional protest behavior or any unlawful means to resolve 
their problems, the probability of mass protests or conflicts in Kazakhstan remains rather 
low. Finally, conflict resolution mechanisms in Kazakhstan are poorly institutionalized as is 
evident in rather underdeveloped legal means and structures aimed at facilitating articula-
tion of the grievances as well as reconciliation or balancing of the conflicting interests. 
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Социальные протесты в Казахстане: факторы и тренды
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В статье исследованы особенности протестов в Казахстане, а также определены их ос-
новные факторы и причины. На основе анализа социологических исследований, жалоб 
граждан в правительство, мониторинга социальных сетей авторами обосновано, что 
протестный потенциал казахстанского общества связан прежде всего с социальными 
и экономическими проблемами. Кроме того, авторы акцентируют внимание читателя 
на том, что протестная активность вызвана противоречиями между целями политиче-
ской и общественной модернизации Казахстана и методами ее осуществления. Пред-
ставлена классификация социально-политических протестов в Казахстане, определена 
их масштабность. Раскрыты основные методы органов государственной власти, на-
правленные на снижение социальной напряженности в казахстанском обществе. Ис-
следована роль институтов гражданского общества в  предотвращении конфликтов. 
Отмечено, что институты гражданского общества в Казахстане недостаточно способ-
ствуют предотвращению деструктивных конфликтов. Вместе с тем выявлены измене-
ния не только протестного поведения казахстанских граждан, но и методов урегули-
рования конфликтов со стороны власти. Исследуется степень влияния Интернета на 
уровень протестности граждан. Результаты проведенных исследований позволяют ав-
торам сделать вывод о том, что протесты в Казахстане имеют больше локальный харак-
тер и не оказывают разрушительного воздействия на общество. Опасность массовых 
акций, таких как социально-политические протесты, в настоящее время отсутствует. 
Это связано с осуществлением социально-экономических реформ, заинтересованно-
стью граждан в укреплении политической стабильности, отсутствием организованной 
политической силы и  институтов гражданского общества, способных консолидиро-
вать население к протестам, страхом казахстанцев перед негативными последствиями 
социально-политических протестов. 
Ключевые слова: социально-политические протесты, конфликты, модернизация, госу-
дарство, власть, гражданское общество.
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